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There are m a n y facts, events and con-
nections await ing scholarly scrutiny in 
the history of the colonial Algeria. One 
of these p r o b l e m s is the European 
populat ion's political attitude and the 
preference of the parties after the Sec-
ond World War. This s tudy surveys the 
divisions, a ims and electoral acts of the 
French parties in Algeria and through 
these it has also surveyed the popular-
ity of the parties a m o n g the popula-
tion. 
We have focused on the parties' ac-
tivities, their inner conflicts and their 
relations to the Mus l ims in Algeria in-
stead of the h i s tory of soc ie ty and 
economy. The main stress has been put 
on the parties and party-politics. There-
fore s o m e f ie lds , h a v e b e e n high-
lighted, e.g. introduction and analysis 
of campaigns before the parliamentary 
elections, and reports of the constitu-
tional dispute. 
The starting-point is the East-Alge-
rian rebellion in May, 1945, because 
this event proved that the French gov-
ernmental circles and parties stick to 
the previous sett lement and they are 
not wi l l ing to tolerate the secession of 
the most important colony, Algeria and 
they step u p against nationalist m o v e -
ments w i th fire and sword. 
The fo l lowing period offers several 
possibilities to look into the Algerian-
pol icy of the parties. Pol i t ics w a s 
marked by constitutional d i sputes in 
1945-1946 including the role of the 
colonies, their status in the future and 
the disputes around the Algerian fun-
damental law in 1947. The Alger ian in-
stitutional sys tem w a s formed in April 
1948 w h e n the fundamenta l l aw came 
into existence: the Algerian assembly 
("parliament") w a s e lected and it p u t 
an e n d to the e n d l e s s cons t i tu t iona l 
disputes and to the referendums. 
The political scrambles were s leuthed 
in the next thematic unit b e t w e e n 1945 
and 1951. This period is relatively un-
troubled compared w i t h the prev ious 
period. The parties sought their place 
in the framework of the colonial le-
g i t imacy a n d c o n t e n d e d w i t h each 
other for the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the 
fundamental law. The quest ions of the 
reforms w e r e on the agenda but the 
main issue, w h i c h determined the con-
flicts a m o n g the parties, w a s the ap-
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proach to the reforms. There w a s great 
t ens ion b e t w e e n the parties, their 
French leaders and the Algerian sec-
tions in the parties, and in the Euro-
pean right w i n g there w a s a dispute 
about w h a t to d o and h o w they should 
approach the original inhabitants po-
litically. The period w a s f inished by the 
parliamentarian elections in 1951. This 
time - as before - illegalities were car-
ried out against the original inhabitants 
in the second elective b o d y by the gov-
ernment in order to prevent ¿the candi-
dates of the nationalist parties from 
getting into the national assembly. 
Final ly those e v e n t s h a v e b e e n 
studied that m a d e the inner opposit ion 
faded a w a y o w i n g to the acceleration 
of the decolonisat ion process, and on 
account of the co lonia l crises (Indo-
c h i n a , Tunisia, Morocco) in the Euro-
pean right w i n g and the parties con-
centrated on ho ld ing the achieved "re-
sults" and they were under the il lusion 
that n o reforms were actually needed 
in the calm Algeria. The 1954 revolt, 
w h i c h w a s inspired by the defeat of the 
French in Indo-China and the h u m -
ming happenings in the North African 
protectorate, w a s an answer to this 
conservative pol icy of the parties and 
the settlers' attitude. 
After the Second World War, the 
union of the parties gathered in the Re-
sistance broke up. The nature and the 
character of the n e w government w a s 
the most important quest ion then. The 
co lon ies p l a y e d an important role in 
these enormous and m o m e n t o u s dis-
putes , so d id Algeria. There w a s an 
election in Algeria in the autumn of 
1945, in w h i c h the communis t party 
a c h i e v e d a remarkable result. This 
s h o w e d that the European populat ion 
w a s not in favour of the right and if 
there w a s a party o n the left, w h i c h 
g a v e the sett lers u n d o u b t e d rights in 
Alger ia ( A C P d i d this), then they 
w o u l d vote that political power . 
The left (communists , socialists) had 
great success in the h o m e l a n d so they 
absolutely outnumbered their oppo-
nents. Thereby they w e r e able to make 
the first draft of the constitution. Both 
parties wanted to introduce w i d e re-
forms (i.e. the socia l i s ts w a n t e d to 
bring in the one turned electoral sys-
tem) but the right w i n g and the radical 
powers c o n d e m n e d them especially in 
Algeria. 
The French populat ion decl ined the 
first draft of the constitution - just as it 
happened in France - w h i c h could be 
understood as the first s ign of a s low 
right movement . This became unambi-
g u o u s by the election of June. Both the 
c o m m u n i s t s a n d the socia l i s ts lost a 
number of votes , h o w e v e r the right be-
came stronger. 
The ACP m a d e the idea of an inde-
p e n d e n t Alger ia its o w n , because it 
s e n s e d the pol i t ical progres se s and 
guarded it steadily in the forthcoming 
time. The other initiation w a s the unity 
of the nationalist parties w i th w h i c h it 
w o u l d have taken u p the struggle more 
effectively against the colonial power . 
There were also vital d isputes inside 
the other parties (especial ly a m o n g the 
socialists) but in the w h o l e those w o n 
w h o wanted- to keep the colonies. The 
draft of the second constitution, w h i c h 
w a s prepared for autumn, d id not 
contain the right of secess ion from the 
French U n i o n wh i l e Algeria continued 
to be an integrant part of France. The 
n e w constitution a l l owed special status 
to s o m e colonial territories - because 
the referendum in October had already 
accepted the draft. 
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All political parties advanced their 
conceptions about the future of Algeria 
dur ing a ha l f -year d i s p u t e about the 
Algerian fundamenta l law. The most 
intense dispute w a s about the Algerian 
electoral sys tem and the representation 
of the populat ion. The Mus l im popu-
lation had the preponderance over the 
European populat ion and the electoral 
system w o u l d have favoured the origi-
nal inhabitants . Because of this, the 
settlers pressured the government and 
the parties accepted a law that Algeria 
continued to be the integrant part of 
France creating a group of departments 
and the two turn electoral sys tem re-
mained. Every French law w a s valid in 
Algeria as wel l . A n Algerian "Parlia-
ment" w a s created but this on ly dealt 
wi th the financial and economic mat-
ters as wel l as implement ing n e w re-
forms b y the n e w f u n d a m e n t a l law. 
H o w e v e r , b o t h c o m m u n i t i e s con-
d e m n e d the status law. One of them 
expected more from it and the other 
thought that it could loose its privi-
leges. 
The frame of the fo l lowing period 
w a s the spring of 1948's election. The 
French government attempted to pre-
vent the nationalist politicians from 
getting mandates . In favour of this they 
c o m m i t t e d m a n y i l l eg i t imacies and 
with this only those French candidates 
w o n w h o uncri t ica l ly accepted the 
presence of France. Therefore, just a 
f ew candidates of the nationalist par-
ties got in the A l g e r i a n A s s e m b l y . 
Those p o w e r s w o n a m o n g the Europe-
ans w h o turned a w a y the fundamental 
law. Thus that k ind of majority re-
ceived place in the Algerian Assembly 
w h o w o u l d h a v e i m p e d e d any serious 
reforms brought in the country. 
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The pol i t ical s t rugg le s m o o t h e d 
d o w n b e t w e e n 1948 and 1951. H o w -
ever, the parties cont inued their f ight 
for the realization of their p r o g r a m m e s 
and expans ion of their party members . 
Time after t ime there w a s a drast ic 
communis ts d e m a n d for the establish-
ment of an independent Algeria and 
the creation of a n e w social rank. 
Similarly, they d id not g ive u p their 
plan to bring the nationalists together 
and step u p as a union. The nationalist 
parties decl ined this initiative repeat-
edly. Apart from this, s o m e approach 
w a s not iceable b e t w e e n the part ies 
whi le the European popula t ion w e r e 
def in i te ly d r a w i n g a w a y f r o m the 
party, because they did not w a n t to 
share the party's idea about the Alge-
rian independence . 
The tragedy of the socialist party 
was that whi l e the moderate circles 
wanted to cooperate w i t h the Musl ims , 
the high-ranking officers of the colonial 
administration used u n l a w f u l m e t h o d s 
against the na t ive p o p u l a t i o n . T h e y 
expedited s o m e minor important re-
forms in the administration and the 
education system, but these reforms 
were not accompl i shed because of the 
tough oppos i t ion of the right w i n g . The 
party's popu lar i ty d e c l i n e d s t ep b y 
step o w i n g to the complete successful -
ness not only in the second but a lso in 
the first elective b o d y w h e r e the set-
tlers could not ident i fy w i t h the pol icy 
of the reforms. 
The right w i n g w a s not as uni f i ed as 
many historians thought before, al-
though their inner problems w e r e al-
most the same. There were minor inner 
crises inside at the Christian Democrat 
MRP and at the Gaullist RPF w h e n the 
homeland leadership w a n t e d to make 
approaches to the political representa-
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tives of the Musl ims . This could have 
happened in the most careful way; the 
Algerian sect ions immediate ly gave in 
their objections to their party's leader-
ship and threatened to step out from 
the m o v e m e n t . Consequent ly , the 
North Africans and the people of the 
motherland d id not see the Algerian 
problems in the same w a y . However , 
in the end a l w a y s the colonials' pol icy 
proceeded through their influential Pa-
risian supporters. 
There w a s a n unl ikely but no less 
important d i spute inside the radicals. 
The most resolute protector of the set-
tlers' rights and the colonial legitimacy, 
proposed a n e w type of alliance wi th 
the moderate nationalists at the begin-
n ing of 1951. According to their moti-
vation, this w o u l d have been necessary 
because through this the t w o c o m m u -
nities could c o m e close together and 
the long presence of the French could 
be ensured. It shou ld be emphas ized 
that this so called "liberal" w i n g did 
not want to g ive expanded rights to the 
natives. It just w a n t e d to ensure wi th 
other m e t h o d s the "eternity" of the 
French presence - just l ike those 
hardliners w h o w e r e not wi l l ing to ne-
gotiate w i t h the nationalists and w h o 
st igmatised the liberals as a "separa-
tist" in reply. A sharp dispute emerged 
b e t w e e n the t w o groups and they en-
tered the elect ion in separate rolls in 
1951. Public op in ion w a s d iv ided by 
the t w o concept ions and because both 
w i n g s had influential leaders the elec-
t ion e n d e d in a "draw". Taken, as a 
w h o l e there w a s n o doubt about the 
victory of the right wing . 
The g r o w i n g colonial crises gener-
ated defens ive reactions from the Alge-
rian settler c o m m u n i t y at the beg in-
ning of the 1950s and the former dis-
agreements almost d isappeared com-
pletely. At the same time the extreme 
left w i n g cont inued its prev ious inde-
pendent policy. 
The initiative of the A C P succeeded 
wi th the nationalists and they estab-
lished a united front after the 1951's 
election. The reason of this w a s that the 
electoral un lawfu lness of the previous 
years had b e e n repeated in the election, 
w h i c h i m p e d e d that the candidates of 
the nationalists could gain mandates in 
the French parliament. It b e c a m e clear 
that they could not de fend their inter-
ests w i t h the former method; therefore 
these parties thought that they w o u l d 
try to enforce the reforms. The Com-
munist party played the definite role in 
the creation of the front, h o w e v e r the 
co-operation did not b e c o m e successful 
in the end. The front d i s so lved b y the 
middle of 1952. 
The colonial crises caused different 
reactions inside the right w i n g parbes. 
The intellectuals inside the MRP more 
f irmly attacked the p o w e r pol i t ics , 
w h i c h the g o v e r n m e n t represented 
in Morocco , Tunis ia a n d Indo-China , 
a n d p l e a d i n g Christ ian pr inc ip les de-
m a n d e d more liberal approach. There-
fore, the Algerian settlers harshly at-
tacked these intellectuals. At the same 
time the traditional moderate right 
w i n g became stronger and those ex-
tremities that almost ext inguished after 
the Second World War strengthened as 
well . O n account of the Cabinet crises 
in France and o w i n g to a s w i n g to the 
right, these powers also ga ined gov-
ernmenta l roles. W i t h t h e m that 
m o v e m e n t ga ined g r o u n d w h i c h w a s 
u n c o m p r o m i s i n g a n d w a n t e d to de-
fend colonial interests at a n y price. 
This kind of pol icy failed after the 
defeat of the French army in Indo-
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China in the spring of 1954. Mendes-
France - presented the left w i n g of the 
radicals - could form the n e w govern-
ment, w h o s igned the armistice wi th 
the Vie tnamese in G e n e v a then fol-
l o w e d on the re forms and g a v e inter-
nal autonomy to Tunisia. The French 
populat ion of Algeria took these steps 
wi th mingled feelings. They admitted 
that they had to f ind the w a y out of the 
war s o m e h o w , but they could not ac-
cept that the prime minister w o u l d 
bring in such a risky reforms in North 
Africa. They w e r e afraid that this so 
called "gracious" reforms might pro-
voke the nationalists and they w o u l d 
behave more forcefully. H o w e v e r , the 
government w a s dec i s ive in the case 
of Algeria: the H o m e Secretary an-
nounced in October that the presence 
of France "will be kept". 
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